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Abstract 
This paper examines how racial differences affect perceptions of distributive 
justice in post-apartheid South Africa.  In ‘divided’ societies, citizens might be 
expected to discriminate on the basis of race or culture in assessing the justice 
of other citizens’ claims.  South Africa is a prime example of a ‘divided’ society 
whereby, in the past, legislation and racial elite culture combined in pervasive 
discrimination.  Given the continued importance of race in daily life in South 
Africa, we might expect that attitudes about distributive justice would continue 
to be racialised, with people considering members of the same ‘racial group’ as 
themselves as being more deserving than members of other groups.  But 
evidence from both national data-sets and a new data-set for Cape Town in 
particular suggests that race has complex and often counter-intuitive effects on 
perceptions of distributive justice.  By some criteria, and some analytic 
techniques, people do not discriminate on the basis of race when assessing 
desert; by other criteria, and other analytic techniques, desert appears still to be 
somewhat coloured in post-apartheid South Africa.  Overall, however, the 
evidence suggests that the effects of race are either weak or work in counter-
intuitive directions.  Rich, white Capetonians are certainly more generous in 
their views on redistribution than is generally assumed. 
Introduction: Race, Class and the Paradox of 
Generosity in South Africa 
Does racial or ethnic diversity inhibit inter-class redistribution?  In the 
industrialised democracies of the ‘North’, there is some debate over the possible 
trade-off between diversity and redistribution (see reviews by Miller, 2004; 
Banting and Kymlicka, 2004).  Diversity might undermine trust and inhibit 
class-based solidarities.  Members of a cultural group might discriminate against 
outsiders, or different groups might be unable to agree on what constitutes 
justice.  In a multi-cultural society, poor people might misdiagnose the sources 
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of their disadvantage, identifying them in cultural rather than class terms.  
Explicitly ‘multi-cultural’ policies might exacerbate such factors.  They might 
‘crowd out’ redistributive policies, by diverting energy and resources. 
The limited extent of redistribution in the USA has been explained in terms of 
diversity and racism.  Gilens (1999), using primarily data from opinion polls, 
found that Americans support pro-poor interventions when these are targeted on 
the deserving poor but oppose ‘welfare’ in general because they suspect it 
favours the undeserving poor – who are defined in racial terms.  Put bluntly, 
welfare is opposed because it is seen as helping lazy black people.  Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004) find a close correlation between ethnic diversity and 
redistribution, whether using cross-national data or data on states and cities 
within the USA alone.  On the other side, other cross-national evidence suggests 
that the adoption of explicitly multi-cultural policies does not correlate with 
changes in the size of the welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka, 2004).  
Attitudinal data from Canada confirms that diversity erodes trust, and trust has a 
positive effect on support for social programmes.  But the effects of diversity on 
support for the welfare state are insignificant (Soroka et al., 2004). 
The issues are, typically, much starker in the countries of the ‘South’.  Members 
of racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious groups frequently resort to violence to 
protect their ‘just’ claims whilst refusing to recognise the claims made by 
members of other groups (Horowitz, 1985).  Apartheid in South Africa was an 
extreme version of this intolerance and discrimination.  Public policies 
entrenched a racially-differentiated class structure and income hierarchy 
(Seekings and Nattrass, 2005).  In the early decades of apartheid, the state 
ensured that white citizens enjoyed a privileged standard of living primarily 
through protected employment, protected that is from competition from black 
people.  The state discriminated racially in regulating access to employment or 
public services (including education and health care).  The official ideology of 
apartheid emphasised that each racial group (and each ethnic group within the 
African population) should look after its own: white South Africans were not 
responsible for the poverty of black South Africans; rich South Africans were 
only responsible for poor South Africans if they were members of the same 
racially-demarcated ‘community’; other than at exceptional moments, the 
official and dominant ideology therefore discouraged the state playing a 
welfarist role across the population as a whole.  Racial segregation, 
discrimination and hierarchy were enforced violently, whenever and wherever 
necessary. 
South African society remains deeply racialised in the early 2000s, despite the 
deracialisation of public policy and the criminalisation of racial discrimination.  
White South Africans have the skills that enable them to earn higher incomes 
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through the market (in South Africa or internationally).  The expansion of 
educational and employment opportunities for black South Africans has resulted 
in the middle and upper classes becoming multi-racial.  But, across South Africa 
as a whole, most white people are rich whilst most black people are not (ibid.).  
This reality was simplified by Thabo Mbeki, then vice-president, in his 
notorious ‘two nations’ speech in 1998: South Africa, he said, comprises two 
nations, the first ‘white, relatively prosperous’ and ‘the second and larger nation 
… black and poor’ (Hansard, 29 May 1998, col. 3378). 
Post-apartheid South Africa is perhaps even more racially divided in social than 
economic terms.  Most people continue to live in residential areas that are, in 
practice, racially segregated, and most children continue to attend schools with 
children of the same ‘race’.  Few South Africans enjoy much inter-racial 
contact, as is clear from a survey conducted in 2000-01 by James Gibson (see 
Gibson, 2004).  In Gibson’s survey, white, coloured and Indian respondents 
were asked a series of questions about African people, and African people the 
same questions about white people.  Only 16 percent of the respondents, 
weighted appropriately, reported having ‘a great deal’ of contact at work with 
members of the designated group, whilst only 6 percent reported having ‘a great 
deal’ of such contact outside work.  Another 13 percent reported having ‘some’ 
such contact at work and another 13 percent reported having some such contact 
outside of work.  Eight percent said they ate meals ‘quite often’ with members 
of the designated group.  A tiny 4 percent said they had ‘quite a number’ of 
friends in the designated group, with another 20 percent saying they had ‘only a 
small number’ of such friends.  Overall, one in three South Africans reported 
any of the above; two out of three South Africans said that they had little or no 
contact with members of the designated group. 
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Gibson found evidence of inter-racial suspicion and 
distrust.  The bars in Figure 1 show the proportion of the weighted sample who 
agreed (or agreed strongly) with each of seven statements about the designated 
group.  Almost one in five South Africans agree that South Africa would be a 
better place without the designated racial group.  Almost half agree that they do 
not believe what members of the designated racial group said, that they feel 
uncomfortable around them, and that they find it hard to imagine ever being 
friends with one of them.  Almost two out of three South Africans agree that it is 
difficult to understand the customs and ways of the designated group.  Without 
exception, larger proportions of African respondents agreed with these 
statements about white people than did white, coloured or Indian respondents 
when asked about African people (see Gibson, 2004: 123-4). 
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Figure 1. The limits to social deracialisation. 
% agreeing with statement
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
It is difficult to understand their customs and
ways
They are untrustworthy
It is hard to imagine ever being friends with
one of them
I feel uncomfortable around them
They are racist*
I often don't believe what they say
South Africa would be a better place without
any of them
 
Note: responses to the racism question are actually disagreements with the statement ‘most … 
are not racist’. 
Source: 2000-01 Truth and Reconciliation data-set; author’s calculations. 
Gibson shows that there is an inverse correlation between most forms of inter-
racial contact and racial distrust:  the more contact that respondents report with 
members of the designated group, the less likely they are to agree with 
statements indicating prejudice or wariness.  The exception to this is contact at 
work, which has no significant effect on inter-racial attitudes.  Gibson shows 
that contact is especially important to white, coloured and Indian respondents 
(ibid: 139-42).  
Limited social deracialisation does not mean that there has been no perceived 
improvement in race relations.  A series of surveys have found that South 
Africans believe that race relations have improved since the end of apartheid.  
According to Gibson’s 2001 survey, 16 percent said that race relations had 
improved a great deal, and a further 45 percent said that race relations had 
improved somewhat.  In 2003, a survey conducted by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation, the Washington Post and Harvard found that as many as 68 percent 
of South Africans believed that race relations were better than they had been 
under apartheid, and as many expected that race relations would continue to 
improve over the next five years (Hamel et al., 2004).  But the same surveys 
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found evidence that improved race relations did not mean good race relations.  
Race relations remains a pressing problem for 49 percent of Gibson’s 
respondents and a further 33 percent described them as important.   
Nor does acknowledging that South Africa remains a racially divided society in 
social terms mean that this racial cleavage is the only or even most important 
social cleavage.  A 2003 survey conducted by the Institute for Justice and 
Reconciliation found that more South Africans identified as the ‘biggest 
division’ not racial divisions but the ‘division between poor and middle 
income/wealthy South Africans’.  Similarly, the 2003 South African Social 
Attitudes Survey (SASAS) conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council 
(HSRC) found that almost as many people believe that there is ‘strong’ or 
‘some’ tension between rich and poor people in South Africa as between 
different races (Roberts, 2004: 16).   
One might expect that the over-riding racialisation of society under apartheid 
and the continuing salience of race have resulted in a close correlation between 
race and attitudes toward distribution or distributive justice.  The government, 
African National Congress and the media frequently accuse white South 
Africans of being opposed to ‘transformation’, i.e. to redistributive social and 
economic policies.  If this was the case, then we would expect to find that 
attitudes towards redistribution correlate with race, and that South Africans will 
assess the desert of other members of their own racial group (i.e. ‘insiders’) 
more favourably or positively than that of members of other racial groups (i.e. 
‘outsiders’).  Attitudes and beliefs about desert in South Africa would be similar 
to those in the USA. 
The actual history of social policy in South Africa throws up a complication.  
Apartheid notwithstanding, South Africa had a set of social policies that are 
unusually progressive and redistributive, relative to the rest of the developing 
world, by the time of the transition to democracy in the early 1990s (Seekings, 
2002).  One of the pillars of this redistribution is the public welfare system.  
South Africa has a set of non-contributory grants, for the elderly, children and 
the disabled, that serve to redistribute resources to the poor and reduce poverty 
significantly.  South Africa spends about 3 percent of GDP on non-contributory 
grants (or social assistance), which is a much higher share of GDP than any 
other developing country.  In the late apartheid and post-apartheid periods, this 
redistribution is in substantial part inter-racial.  South Africa thus presents social 
scientists with what I have called the ‘paradox of generosity’: rich, white South 
Africans pay taxes that fund old-age and other pensions for poor, black South 
Africans.  Why did a system founded on racial discrimination and consequent 
inequality develop such a redistributive welfare system?  Progressive social (and 
tax) policies had their origins in the exceptional circumstances of the early 
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1940s (see Seekings, 2000, 2005a, 2005c), but at some point in the apartheid era 
public opinion among white South Africans might have swung into accord with 
the reality of growing inter-racial redistribution.  It is possible that white South 
Africans were willing to support redistribution precisely because they are aware 
of their vulnerability as racially-identifiable members of a privileged class 
(Seekings, 2004).  In other words, to turn around the ‘mis-diagnosis’ argument 
made by left critics of multi-culturalism in the North, white South Africans 
might worry that their class privileges will be mis-diagnosed as racial ones by 
most South Africans.  Self-defence and hence self-interest therefore might make 
white South Africans more prepared to support redistributive policies.   
This paper uses evidence from surveys conducted nationally and in Cape Town 
to explore attitudes towards redistribution in post-apartheid South Africa, and, in 
particular, the extent to which race affects people’s assessments of desert.  Is 
desert ‘coloured’ in that race affects whether someone or some group is 
considered deserving?  Using evidence from surveys means that this paper is 
subject to some of the standard criticisms of attitudinal data.  Public opinion 
might not matter much in terms of public policy-making, there might be a weak 
relationship between reported attitudes and actual behaviour, and what people 
say they think might be affected by the methodology of one-on-one structured 
interviews.1   
Race and distributive justice in South Africa 
Despite the importance of race and inequality in South Africa, little research has 
been conducted on how attitudes towards inequality are racialised.  This is 
largely because there is little research into any aspect of attitudes towards 
inequality.  The limited research on race and distributive justice in South Africa 
throws up some confusing findings.   
The 2003 SASAS indicates both similarities and differences between the 
attitudes of white and black people towards income inequality and government 
policies regarding inequality.  Almost all South Africans, regardless of race, 
concur that incomes are too unequal and that the government should take more 
responsibility to reduce inequality.  But white and African people disagree in 
their attitudes towards land reform and affirmative action, with African people 
in favour and white people opposed (Roberts, 2004b).  
                                                 
1 It should be noted that the use of vignettes described below was pioneered in the USA precisely 
to avoid some of the difficulties in interviewing people about views that they might not want to 
be seen to hold.  
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In the international World Values Survey (WVS), respondents were faced with a 
‘forced choice’ question, choosing between the statements ‘the government 
should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’ and 
‘people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves’.  The 2001 
WVS data shows that African and coloured people favour government 
responsibility more than white people (although a higher proportion of white 
people supported government responsibility in 2001 than in previous rounds of 
the WVS, in the 1980s and 1990s).  The WVS also found some racial 
differences in opinions on the perceived causes of poverty.  White South 
Africans are inclined to attribute poverty to laziness, whereas African people 
point to the unfair treatment of people by society.  Further, forced to choose 
between the statements ‘incomes should be made more equal’ and ‘we need 
larger income differences as incentives for individual effort’, African people 
incline toward the former and white people to the latter.  
Studies conducted by the HSRC between 1994 and 2000 add to this picture 
through probing how respondents see their individual situation and that of their 
‘group’ relative to other people or groups.  White South Africans viewed their 
current personal position as good but the position of their group as bad, whilst 
black South Africans viewed their personal position as bad but the position of 
their group as ‘OK’.  Most black people also have muted expectations of 
changes in future for them personally, but are positive about the future of their 
group.  The HSRC study also explored who it was that respondents compared 
themselves with.  When assessing their individual situation, most people 
compared themselves on the basis of class (or, alternatively, with people in their 
neighbourhood or friends), not on the basis of race.  When assessing their group 
situation, people were more likely to choose racial or ethnic comparisons in the 
mid-1990s, but by the late 1990s were shifting to a more class-based comparison 
(Klandermans, Roefs and Olivier, 2001: 56-73).  
These findings assess race in terms of the racial classification (however defined) 
of the respondent.  Thus black and white respondents have different attitudes on 
some issues and similar attitudes on others.  But, when people consider 
government assistance to the poor, they generally take into account the 
characteristics of the poor, and especially whether, in their opinion, the poor are 
deserving of assistance according to some moral, behavioural or demographic 
criteria.  Respondents might believe that the government is doing too little for 
some poor but too much for others.  Typically, ‘lazy’ poor people are considered 
less deserving than people who are poor because they are unable to provide for 
themselves (for example the elderly, the sick or disabled, or children).  In 
societies where poverty is attributed to laziness, such as in the USA and East 
Asia, citizens tend to oppose more welfare spending by the government (but 
favour interventions such as income tax credits to the working poor).  In some 
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societies, demographic or social factors might inform people’s attitudes towards 
inequality-reducing policies.  In the USA, the media-informed view that black 
people are especially lazy and thus undeserving results in widespread opposition 
to welfare spending in general (Gilens, 1999).  In more obviously culturally-
divided societies, perceived desert might well be perceived to follow cultural 
lines.  For example, a Hausa person from northern Nigeria might believe that the 
Nigerian government does too little to help poor Hausa people but too much to 
help poor Yoruba people.   
Elsewhere, I show that distributive justice perceptions and attitudes in South 
Africa are mutable, in that responses are sensitive to the precise phrasing of the 
question posed, and may change over relatively short periods of time.  South 
Africans distinguish sharply between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor 
(Seekings, 2005b).  In this paper I focus on how distributive justice perceptions 
are affected by race – meaning both the race of the respondent and the race of 
the prospectively ‘deserving’ subject or beneficiary of a pro-poor intervention or 
policy.  I use survey data, but the exercise is similar in important respects to 
recent experimental research conducted by Justine Burns.  In Burns’ 
experiments, secondary school students in Cape Town played the ‘dictator 
game’, in which players are given money and then choose how much to pass 
onto anonymous ‘partners’, whose photo they have seen but otherwise know 
nothing about.  Burns found that there was no direct race effect, i.e. that players 
did not discriminate against partners who appeared to be racially different.  This 
behaviour appeared to be motivated by an aversion to inherited inequality, and 
racial appearance was taken as a proxy for inherited inequality (Burns, 2004). 
Instead of conducting field experiments, I use experimental vignettes included in 
a survey instrument.  My experimental vignette is based on a ‘laid-of worker’ 
experiment used in the USA by Sniderman and Piazza (1993), in their study of 
the nuances of American attitudes around race.  Respondents are presented with 
a scenario in which a person is retrenched, and are then invited to suggest how 
much (if any) financial assistance that person should receive from the 
government whilst looking for work.  The scenario varies insofar as the 
retrenched person is given different characteristics: white or black, male or 
female, younger or older, single or married, with or without children, and 
dependable or not dependable.  Sniderman and Piazza found that white, 
conservative Americans are less supportive of government assistance in general 
than white, liberal Americans, but they are – counter-intuitively – more 
favourably inclined to supporting black claimants (i.e. retrenched workers, in the 
vignette) than white claimants.  Even faced with an unmarried woman with 
children – i.e. a claimant who violates conservative family norms – white 
conservative respondents are more likely to support assistance if the claimant is 
black than if she is white.  If the claimant is described as a dependable worker in 
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the vignette, then conservatives are especially inclined to discriminate in favour 
of a black person!  Sniderman and Piazza continue to show that these counter-
intuitive findings co-exist with less surprising findings when white Americans 
are asked about the justice of claims made by black people as a group.  The 
point is not that one sets of responses is right and the other set wrong, but rather 
that people hold complex sets of beliefs.  Failing to recognise this complexity, 
Sniderman and Piazza (1993: 86-7) conclude, leads too many commentators to 
see racism ‘where it is not’ and fail to see it ‘where it is’, and thus ‘to ignore 
what they should criticise, and to criticise what they should defend.’  
Experimental vignettes have been used in South Africa by Gibson and Gouws in 
their studies of tolerance (Gibson and Gouws, 2003) and reconciliation (Gibson, 
2004).  In this paper, I report on the experimental use of the ‘laid-off worker’ 
vignette in a 2003 survey, alongside responses to more standard questions about 
attitudes to distributive issues. 
Data come from the 2003 Cape Area Study conducted in South Africa’s second 
largest city, Cape Town.  Cape Town has long had a distinctive demographic, 
social and economic profile.  The Western Cape never had a large ‘African’ 
population, and through most of the twentieth century there remained tight 
restrictions on immigration, residence and employment for African people.  
Even in the early twenty-first century, half of the population of Cape Town is 
‘coloured’, only just over one quarter is African and just under one quarter is 
‘white’.  There is rapid immigration of African people into the city from poorer, 
more rural areas of the Eastern Cape, but this immigration tends to reinforce 
rather than erode racial segregation and inequality because immigrants tend to 
have few skills.  There is no significant African ‘middle-class’ in Cape Town, in 
contrast to the country as a whole.  The resulting relationship between race and 
income is evident in Table 1.  Cape Town’s population comprises predominantly 
African poor strata, predominantly coloured middle income strata, and a 
predominantly white upper-income group.  Only the coloured population shows 
marked heterogeneity in class and income terms, ranging from the very poor (in 
areas of, for example, Mannenberg and Bonteheuwel) to the rich (in, for 
example, Gatesville).  Overall, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of income 
in Cape Town is about 0.58.  
Cape Town’s demographic profile entails opportunities and constraints for 
analysing the racialisation of distributive justice norms and perceptions.  The 
primary opportunity derives from the fact that the city’s population comprises 
three racial groups that are both sizeable and are widely viewed as distinct.  The 
constraint is that the close relationship between race and class makes it 
impossible to separate race and class effects.  In Cape Town it is not possible to 
ask (for example) a poor white person what he or she thinks of the desert of a 
poor African person, because no white people are poor in absolute terms. 
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Table 1: Household incomes by race, Cape Town 2002 
Household income 
(Rands per month) 
African (%) Coloured 
(%) 
White (%) Total (%) 
0-1999 20 12 1 33 
2000-5999 10 23 4 37 
6000+ 2 12 17 31 
Total 32 47 22 101 
Source: Own calculations using Cape Area Panel Study, 2002. 
The 2003 Cape Area Study (CAS) focused on social and political attitudes and 
behaviour. It was designed not only to generate data for research but also to 
experiment with questionnaire design and to develop research capacity.  
Fieldwork was conducted in predominantly white areas by undergraduate 
students from the University of Cape Town and in predominantly African and 
coloured areas by a commercial social research company, with funding from the 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation (as part of its support for the Centre for Social 
Science Research at the University of Cape Town).  African fieldworkers 
conducted the interviews in African areas and coloured fieldworkers did so in 
coloured areas, but in ‘white’ areas both the fieldworkers (university students) 
and the respondents were racially diverse.  Fieldwork was conducted in 
September and October 2003.   
The sample comprised 588 adults spread across metropolitan Cape Town.  It in 
fact comprised three separate samples, one each for areas with predominantly 
African, predominantly coloured (or Indian) and predominantly white 
populations.  Each of these samples was drawn using a two-stage cluster sample.  
Seventy ‘enumerator areas’ (EAs, as defined by Statistics South Africa for the 
1996 Population Census) were selected on a probabilistic basis.  White areas 
were over-sampled to cope with anticipated lower response.  Then, in each EA, 
aerial photographs were used to select ten households.  Within each household, 
fieldworkers were instructed to list the names and birthdays of all household 
members over the age of eighteen, and to interview whoever had the next 
birthday.  The final, actual sample had three weaknesses.  First, student 
fieldworkers were unable to complete their assigned interview loads, conducting 
a total of 188 out of 200 interviews in white areas.  Secondly, almost one-third 
of the interviews were in ‘substitute’ households because the fieldworkers were 
unable to access the sampled household or the household member with the next 
birthday.  Thirdly, although fieldworkers appear to have complied with the ‘next 
birthday’ rule, they did end up with a sample with an implausibly high 
proportion of women.  The data reported in this paper are weighted to adjust for 
race and gender, so that the weighted sample corresponds to the total population 
of Cape Town (according to the 2001 Population Census). 
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Are ‘the poor’ deserving? 
Data from standard attitudinal variables in the CAS 2003 survey confirm the 
finding from previous surveys that there is wide support for redistributive 
policies among South Africans.  Massive majorities (over 80 percent) in Cape 
Town supported the government ensuring that children from poor families have 
the same opportunities as children from richer families (question F.4), an 
increase in the value of the state old age pension (F.6) and government help for 
the unemployed (F.14).  A similarly massive majority says that the government 
is doing ‘too little’ for the poor (F.38).  Smaller majorities (less than 60 percent) 
supported the government reducing the differences between rich and poor (F.12) 
and the introduction of a basic income grant for all (F.13).  Overall, the picture 
appears to be wide but not unconditional support for pro-poor interventions. 
It should be noted that question F.6 refers to the non-contributory, ostensibly 
means-tested old-age pension that is the main pillar of South Africa’s unusual 
social assistance system.  The pension is generous, paying about US$100 per 
month, and it is paid to a very high proportion of elderly South Africans.  
Question F.13 refers to a policy that has been proposed (most notably by a 
government committee of inquiry in 2002) and widely discussed, but does not 
enjoy the support of the government. 
These attitudes correlate weakly with social and demographic variables.  Cross-
tabulation suggests a weak relationship between race and attitudes, with white 
respondents slightly more likely to be opposed to pro-poor policies and coloured 
respondents slightly more likely to support them.  Race affects attitudes on the 
different items in different ways.  Whilst there was much less support for a basic 
income grant (F.13) among white respondents (and among respondents from 
high-income African and coloured households), white respondents were slightly 
more supportive of increasing the old-age pension (F.6) than poorer coloured 
and African respondents (see Figure 2).  Regressing the composite variable 
derived from the factor analysis against race alone suggests that there is a 
significant but weak race effect, with being white correlating with a less pro-
poor attitude; the coefficient of determination (i.e. r2), however, is very low 
(0.04).  Gender, age, marital status and parental status are not significant, add 
little to the explanatory power of the model and do not affect the significance of 
race, but adding education removes the effect of being white relative to being 
African and adding an affluence variable largely removes the effect of being 
white relative to being coloured.  Even with all of these variables included in the 
model, the r2 remains low at 0.08. 
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Figure 2: Attitudes towards pro-poor policies, by race 




































The Cape Town population seems to be broadly supportive of pro-poor policies.  
The most directly comparative variable is the CAS 2003 question F.28, which 
replicates a question used in the World Values Survey.  Table 2 aggregates the 
responses into three categories: agree with the statement on the left, in between, 
and agree with the statement on the right.  A comparison of Table 2 with WVS 
data for South Africa as a whole shows that the attitudes of white, African and 
coloured people in Cape Town are broadly in line with the attitudes recorded by 
the WVS.  White respondents are less inclined toward state responsibility and 




Table 2: Attitudes towards government and private initiative, Cape Town 
2003 
Now I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views 
on this scale?  1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left, 10 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in 
between, you can choose any number in between. 
The government 
should take more 
responsibility to 
ensure that every-one 
is provided for 










Total CT 35% 40% 24% 100% 4.8 2.8 
African 36% 50% 13% 100% 4.6 2.6 
Coloured 41% 29% 30% 100% 5.0 3.1 
White 22% 50% 28% 100% 5.6 2.5 
Note: S.d. is the abbreviation for standard deviation.  The total data are weighted. 
Does race affect whether some people are 
considered more deserving than others? 
Already it appears that some respondents are discerning between different pro-
poor interventions, and hence perhaps different categories of poor people.  The 
overwhelming support for increased old-age pensions (F.6) and for equal 
opportunities for children (F.4), even among the less pro-poor white 
respondents, suggest that the elderly and children are seen as deserving.  
Similarly, almost all respondents agree that the government should help the 
unemployed (F.14).  In contrast, more respondents – including a majority of 
white respondents – are opposed to a guaranteed minimum income through a 
universal basic income grant (F.13).  A basic income grant would be of primary 
benefit to those poor people who are not covered by the existing system of social 
assistance, which provides pensions or grants to the elderly, the disabled and 
poor families with children (through the Child Support Grant).  The major hole 
in the social safety net is provision for the unemployed, i.e. working-age adults 
who are unable to work not because of age or disability but because there are no 
jobs.  Whilst responses to F.14 show that South Africans think that the 
unemployed are deserving of some kind of assistance, this does not convert into 
support for a guaranteed minimum income for all (through, for example, a basic 
income grant). 
There are two possible explanations for these attitudes towards the unemployed.  
The first is that some South Africans want the government to help the 
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unemployed through job creation or workfare, not welfare.  Unfortunately we 
did not explore this directly in the survey.  The second is that some South 
Africans favour support for some unemployed people but not all unemployed 
people, i.e. that they discriminate within the category of unemployed.  This 
possibility can be examined using the CAS 2003 data.  More specifically, the 
CAS 2003 data can be used to see if there is any evidence of racial 
discrimination in respondents’ assessment of the desert of unemployed people. 
The experimental vignettes included in CAS 2003 provide a more nuanced set of 
insights into the ways in which desert is linked to the characteristics of the 
beneficiary as well as those of the respondent.  One vignette was a version of 
Sniderman and Piazza’s laid-off or retrenched worker experiment.  Respondents 
were told: ‘The government provides grants to some people in need, especially 
the elderly.  I am going to describe a situation, and then ask you what the 
government should do to help the person involved.’  The description takes the 
following form:  
A worker has been retrenched from a company.  [He/she] is a 
[white/coloured/African] [man/woman], in [his/her] [20s/30s/40s], 
[single/married] and [with/without] children.  [He/she] is a 
[dependable/not dependable] worker and now [is/is not] actively 
looking for work. 
Ten different scenarios were used, each with about sixty respondents.  The first 
scenario, for example, was this: ‘A worker has been retrenched from a company.  
He is a white man, in his 40s, married and with children.  He is a dependable 
worker and is actively looking for work.’  The respondent is then asked: ‘Should 
the Government provide financial assistance to this person whilst he/she is 
unemployed?’  If the respondent says ‘yes’, he or she is then asked ‘how 
much?’.  We tried to ensure that each scenario was used in each EA in our 
sample so that each scenario was used with broadly similar sub-samples.  The 
details of each scenario are set out in the first part of Table 3. 
In South Africa there is no general public financial assistance for the 
unemployed.  The Unemployment Insurance Fund provides earnings-related 
assistance for a limited period of unemployment, but only to people who have 
contributed to the fund in the past.  Its limited duration and exclusion of non-
contributors mean that only a very small proportion of the unemployed receive 
UIF benefits.  Most unemployed are compelled to rely on their own savings or, 
more generally, their kin.  The general scenario would therefore probably be 
understood as an extension of the existing welfare system.  
In summary, the experiment involves a respondent (answering the questions) 
and a ‘subject’ or ‘beneficiary’; the respondent makes an initial assessment of 
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the desert of the beneficiary; if the beneficiary is deemed deserving, the 
respondent is asked to assess what award or sum of money is appropriate.  
Respondents are thus making two assessments: should the subject get 
assistance? If so, how much?  The first column in the second part of Table 3 
shows the percentage of respondents approving of assistance.  Data are given for 
each of the ten specified sets of characteristics of the retrenched worker.  
Overall, six out of ten respondents favoured financial assistance to the 
retrenched worker, with three out of ten respondents saying ‘no’, 7 percent 
saying ‘maybe’ or ‘it depends’ and just 2 percent saying that they did not know.  
The variations between the scenarios were relatively small.  A maximum of 76 
percent of respondents supported financial assistance for a married, white man, 
in his 40s and with children, who was a dependable worker and was actively 
looking for work (scenario #1).  A minimum of 49 percent approved financial 
assistance to an unmarried, childless, white man in his 20s (scenario #3).  An 
almost identical proportion (50 percent) approved financial assistance to his 
African equivalent (despite the added stipulation that he was a dependable 
worker and was actively looking for work – scenario #5).  These three cases 
indicate that the classic male breadwinner is deemed more deserving than the 
young man, suggesting a conservative, family-oriented conception of desert.  
The four most deserving scenarios, according to the initial assessment, all 
entailed subjects with children; the three least deserving scenarios all entailed 
subjects without children. 
The pattern in the amounts that respondents awarded is broadly similar but not 
identical to the pattern of whether they favoured financial assistance at all.  The 
amounts awarded were notional in that the question asked how much should the 
government provide per month.  In Table 3, the first column for ‘mean amount’ 
of award includes only those awards greater than zero, i.e. where the respondent 
said ‘yes’ in response to the initial question about desert.  There is considerable 
variation, with the mean award in the most deserving scenario – the older, 
married white man with children, who is a dependable worker and is actively 
looking for work (scenario #1) is almost double the mean award in the least 
deserving scenario – the coloured man, in his 30s, single and without children, 
but a dependable worker and actively looking for work (scenario #8). 
The second column for ‘mean amount’ in Table 3 sets a value of 0 for cases 
where the respondent did not consider that the beneficiary should receive 
government assistance.  The figures in this column thus combine the effects of 
both decisions, i.e. whether the beneficiary is deemed deserving and how much 
he/she should receive.  These data confirm that scenarios #1, 6 and 7 involve the 




Table 3: Specification of and responses to each scenario in the vignette, Cape Town, 2003 
Characteristics of subject or beneficiary Respondents’ assessment of desert Scenario 
Gender Population 
group 










(R) if yes 
n Mean amount 
(R) if yes or no 
1 Male white 40s Yes yes yes 76 65 1302 47 993 
2 Female White 30s No Yes - 59 53 907 32 514 
3 Male White 20s no No - 49 61 769 30 356 
4 Male African 40s yes Yes - 61 61 834 38 533 
5 Male African 20s no no yes 50 57 899 30 438 
6 Female African 20s no Yes - 67 61 1039 40 711 
7 Female African 30s yes No yes 63 50 991 32 689 
8 Male coloured 30s no no yes 58 59 689 36 398 
9 Female coloured 40s yes Yes - 62 63 1036 39 642 
10 Female coloured 20s no No Yes 60 58 753 33 482 
Total  60 588 935 357 573 
Notes: data are weighted.  The most deserving scenarios are marked in bold, the least deserving in italics. 
 
Table 4 pools together the different scenarios and then separates results 
according to the race of the retrenched worker (or beneficiary) and respondent, 
as well as the ensuing beneficiary/respondent pairings.  (Data for a wider range 
of characteristics of the beneficiary and respondent are set out in Appendix 1).2  
On the face of it, the data in Table 4 suggest that the race of the beneficiary 
made no difference to the initial decision.  Appendix 1 shows also that gender 
made a minimal difference; age, marital status and whether or not the 
respondent had children made some difference.  These findings are corroborated 
by bivariate regressions: the respondents being married or being aged in their 
40s was weakly significant (at the 10 percent level, with a z-statistic below 2) 
but with weak effects, whilst having children was significant (at the 5 percent 
level), but still with weak effects (having children increases the probability of 
being considered deserving by 8 percent).  Neither the beneficiary’s race nor 
gender was significant in even a bivariate regression. 
The middle part of Table 4 suggests that the race of the respondent also makes 
relatively limited difference to whether or not the retrenched worker is 
considered deserving of public assistance.  The results for other characteristics 
of the beneficiaries and respondents are shown in Appendix 1.  Women were 
slightly more generous than men in their assessment of desert, married 
respondents were slightly more generous than unmarried ones, and – counter-
intuitively, perhaps – white respondents were slightly more generous than either 
African and coloured respondents. 
The limited effects of race can also be seen in the pairings reported in the third 
part of Table 4 (but note that the sub-samples are very small for some pairs, 
especially white respondents paired with white or coloured beneficiaries).  The 
most deserving pairing is the pairing of white respondent and African 
beneficiary; the least deserving is the pairing of coloured respondent and 
African beneficiary.  But the differences are not large: 67 percent versus 55 
percent approving.  These descriptive statistics seem to imply that respondents 
are slightly more positive about beneficiaries in the same racial grouping as 
themselves: African respondents consider African beneficiaries most deserving, 
coloured respondents consider coloured beneficiaries most deserving, and white 
respondents consider white beneficiaries at least as deserving as African ones.  
                                                 
2 Some caution is required when interpreting the data on the characteristics of the beneficiary.  
Only ten scenarios were used, out of a total of 144 possible sets of characteristics (gender having 
2 values, race 3 values, age 3 values, marital status 2 values, parental status 2 values and 
dependability 2 values).  This means that the variables are probably not entirely orthogonal, 
although calculations standard tests suggest that this is not significant.  But not using all possible 
combinations might result in an exaggeration of respondents’ generosity towards some 
characteristics (such as being older) and hostility towards others (such as being younger) – 
because the descriptions of older men perhaps tended to render them more deserving in terms of 
other variables than did the descriptions of young men. 
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But regressions do not reveal that same-race pairings are significant, even when 
controlling for race. 
Table 4: Perceived desert, by race of ‘beneficiary’ and respondent, 
pooled sample 




Std. dev. N 
Characteristic of retrenched worker (beneficiary) 
White 61 179 1035 768 80 
African 60 229 947 764 129 
Race / 
population 
group Coloured 60 108 836 708 95 
Characteristic of respondent 
White 64 139 1519 973 56 
African 61 197 685 399 112 
Race / 
population 
group Coloured 59 234 913 750 136 
Respondent-beneficiary pairing 
White-to-white 66 41 1959 1297 11 
White-to-African 67 55 1486 817 28 
White-to-coloured 58 43 1288 867 17 
African-to-white 63 61 745 289 32 
African-to-African 63 79 712 506 48 
African-to-coloured 58 57 591 273 32 
Coloured-to-white 58 69 1014 646 37 
Coloured-to-African 55 93 900 794 53 
Coloured-to-coloured 62 72 850 765 46 
Note: mean amount awarded is only if an award was approved, i.e. if >0. 
The importance of some of these factors is not the same, however, when it 
comes to the amounts awarded to deserving beneficiaries, as we can see in the 
third column of Table 4 (and in Appendix 1).  White respondents proposed 
much larger grants or awards (to be paid by the government, it should be 
remembered).  The mean award made by a white respondent was more than 
double the mean award made by an African respondent.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising, given that white South Africans have much higher incomes and 
thus probably have a more inflated sense of what constitutes a reasonable 
minimum.  Unfortunately our data on household income is poor, but we can 
compare responses in our vignette to the mean household income in the 
neighbourhood where the respondent is resident, using data from the 2001 
Population Census.  Figure 3 shows that the actual award rises with 
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neighbourhood income.3  Figure 4 shows the awards made as a share of mean 
household income in the neighbourhood, both on an annualised basis.4  Both 
figures use logged incomes on the x-axis and show the fitted regression line and 
95 percent confidence interval.  Figure 4 shows that, as household income rises, 
so the award declines as a share of household income.  In low income 
neighbourhoods, the mean award is about one half of mean household income.  
In high income neighbourhoods, the actual award is much larger (as we can see 
in Figure 3), but the mean award is just one-tenth or less of mean household 
income.  Bivariate regression shows that the mean award in a neighbourhood 
with a mean household income of R150 000 per year is about R400 per month 
higher than the mean award in a neighbourhood where the mean income is only 
R50 000 per year.  Rich Capetonians are generous in absolute terms, but miserly 
in relation to their own affluence. 
















mean household income in neighbourhood
95% CI Fitted values
g5corrected
Award in relation to household income
  
 
More curiously, white beneficiaries were awarded the largest grants.  Not only 
did white respondents seem to discriminate by race in their awards, proposing 
larger grants to white than African beneficiaries and the smallest grants to 
                                                 
3 Note that the award is per month, the household income per year. 




coloured beneficiaries,5 but coloured and African respondents also followed a 
similar pattern, although less markedly.  Might this, perhaps, reflect setting the 
grant on an implicit replacement income basis, such that larger grants are 
awarded to people earning more before they were retrenched?  This is how the 
South African UIF system works. 



























mean household income in neighbourhood
95% CI Fitted values
g5divwi
Generosity of award in relation to household income
  
Multi-variate regression analysis 
The real power of using vignettes is in multivariate analysis, i.e. analysing 
responses in terms of a whole set of variables, using the pooled sample, i.e. all 
588 cases together rather than divided into separate sub-samples.  Multivariate 
regressions allow us to examine the relationships between the characteristics of 
the beneficiary (i.e. the retrenched worker), the characteristics of the respondent 
him- or herself, and the respondent’s decisions.  The regression analysis here 
proceeds in three stages.  First, using probit regressions, we examine whether 
various sets of variables explain the initial decision of whether to identify the 
subject as deserving or not.  Then we examine whether various sets of variables 
explain how much the respondent awards to the subject, if the respondent 
considers the subject deserving.  Finally, we combine these in a Heckman two-
                                                 
5 But note that the n is small for white respondents, and thus especially in the pairings. 
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stage model.  Heckman’s technique is appropriate here because the initial 
decision of desert and the subsequent decision of how much to award are 
influenced by different factors.  These stages are then repeated for respondents 
from each racial group. 
Appendix 2 shows the regression results for a series of probit regressions in 
which saying ‘yes’ in the initial question (G.3) is the dependent variable.  Model 
A shows the results for a probit regression using only beneficiary characteristics 
as independent variables.  Model B shows the results for a probit regression 
against respondent socio-demographic characteristics alone.  Model C shows the 
results for a probit regression using both beneficiary characteristics and 
respondent socio-demographic characteristics.  Model D is a more parsimonious 
version of Model D.  These are marginal effects models.  The coefficients 
reported are the dprobit coefficients.  The data are weighted by race and gender. 
The basic findings are simple: neither the characteristics of the beneficiary (as 
set out in the scenarios, with the exception of one variable) nor the socio-
demographic characteristics of the respondents are significant in influencing the 
initial assessment of desert.  The exceptional variable is whether the beneficiary 
has children.  This is significant at the 10 percent level in Model A and at the 5 
percent level in Model D.  In Model A, beneficiaries with children are 31 
percent more likely to be considered deserving than beneficiaries without 
children.  In Model D, the effect is reduced to 10 percent.  In none of the models 
is the race of the beneficiary or of the respondent significant.  Together, these 
variables explain very little of the variance in the initial assessment of desert 
(the pseudo r-squared is tiny in every model).  Neither of our variables for the 
respondent’s class – a crude household-level variable (“rich”) or the mean 
household income in the neighbourhood (“neighbourhood income”) is 
significant.  
A very different picture emerges when we examine the size of the awards that 
respondents make to those subjects whom they have said are deserving.  
Appendix 3 reports the results of regression analysis of the amounts awarded by 
respondents who initially assessed the subject as deserving (i.e. answered yes to 
G.3).  The regressions use logged data for the amounts awarded, transforming 
the initial skewed distribution into a reasonably normal one.  Model A shows 
that none of the characteristics of the beneficiary correlate significantly with the 
amounts awarded.  But there is a batch of significant correlations in Model B 
(and Model C, which combines beneficiary and respondent characteristics).  
Both African and coloured respondents make very much smaller awards than the 
omitted category of white respondents (even controlling for affluence); 
respondents with children make slightly smaller awards than those without, and 
respondents who are working make slightly larger awards than those who are 
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not (even controlling for race and affluence).  Whether respondent and 
beneficiary are of the same race is not significant.  Model A explains very little 
of the variance in awards.  Model B compares much more (with an adjusted r-
squared of 0.15).  Combining the two in Model C results in a slightly higher 
adjusted r-squared (0.18).  This is a semi-logarithmic model, with the 
coefficients indicating the proportional changes in the size of the awards made.  
Thus, in Model C, if the respondent is African then the award made is reduced 
by 65 percent and being coloured reduces the award made by 18 percent, 
relative to the respondent being white, and controlling for all of the other 
variables in the model. 
Model D in Appendix 3 is a more parsimonious version of Model C, including 
just six variables.  All of the correlations are significant, most at the 1 percent 
level, and the r-squared is a high 0.36, meaning that these variables are 
explaining about one-third of all of the variance in the size of the award.  
Controlling for just these variables, the size of the award is larger if the 
beneficiary has children, and is smaller if the beneficiary is African or coloured; 
it rises with the respondent’s neighbourhood income, but is smaller if the 
respondent is African or coloured.  Controlling for the respondent’s 
neighbourhood income has the effect of increasing the effect of the race of the 
respondent, not reducing it.  In other words there are clear class and race effects 
in terms of the size of the award made: rich people are more generous, and white 
people are more generous even controlling for income.  (Note that, as we have 
already seen, respondents in high-income neighbourhoods are generous in 
absolute terms, but not relative to their incomes). 
The results of a Heckman two-stage analysis, using selected variables, are 
shown in Appendix 4.  What the Heckman regression does is regress the size of 
the award on a set of variables whilst taking into account the prior probit 
regression on whether the respondent considers the subject deserving at all.  It 
thus combines the steps treated separately in Appendices 2 and 3.  It only makes 
sense to use the Heckman technique if the factors explaining one decision (is the 
subject deserving?) are different from those explaining the second (if so, how 
much should the subject receive per month?).  The use of a Heckman analysis is 
shown to be warranted by the very low probability of the two equations not 
being independent of each other (p=0.008, significant at the 1 percent level).   
In the initial assessment of desert, the race of the respondent is not significant.  
But the race of the beneficiary and whether the beneficiary has children are 
significant.  Respondents considered African and coloured subjects more 
deserving, and subjects with children more deserving also.  In the assessment of 
the size of the award, all of the race variables are significant, even controlling 
for class (i.e. neighbourhood income).  The race of the respondent is very 
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significant, and has a substantial effect on the awards made (as we already saw 
in Appendix 3).  The race of the beneficiary is now also shown to be significant, 
with African and coloured beneficiaries getting smaller awards than white 
beneficiaries.  The coefficients on beneficiary’s race are, however, much smaller 
than the coefficients on respondent’s race. 
Some of these results are somewhat surprising and some are very counter-
intuitive.  Insofar as race influences the first stage of assessing desert, it is only 
in that there is some discrimination in favour of African and coloured subjects.  
But the effects are small, and it appears that assessments of desert are influenced 
primarily by factors that we are not measuring.  In assessing the appropriate size 
of an award or grant, race matters.  Respondents in rich areas are more generous 
(but not in proportion to their incomes), whilst white respondents are more 
generous even when we control for neighbourhood income.  This suggests that 
white South Africans – or, at least, white Capetonians – are prepared to be 
generous in part because they are rich and in part because they are white.  Race 
and class both matter. 
Much more counter-intuitive is the finding that all respondents are somewhat 
more generous towards white beneficiaries!  Respondents do not appear to 
favour members of their own racial group.  It appears that, in this experiment, 
South Africans are more inclined to support retrenched workers at the unequal 
level to which they might be presumed to be accustomed, which means 
replicating the racial inequalities of the past.  Race might be seen as a proxy for 
income or standard of living, prior to retrenchment.  This result would be less 
surprising in a society where income support (in times of unemployment, poor 
health or old age) is linked to previous income, as is the case in the 
‘conservative’ or corporatist welfare regimes of continental Europe, including 
Germany (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin et al., 1999).  It is more curious, 
however, in South Africa, where benefit-defined welfare provision 
predominates, and income-defined benefits are limited to working people in 
formal employment.  
Disaggregating by race 
It is possible that the factors that respondents take into account vary according to 
the race of the respondent.  For example, white respondents might discriminate 
against African subjects but not coloured subjects.  Appendix 5 reports the 
results of selected probit regressions on the initial assessment of desert, 
according to the race of the respondent.  Among African respondents, neither the 
characteristics of the respondent nor the characteristics of the beneficiary are 
significant.  Among coloured respondents, being rich increases the probability 
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that the respondent assesses the subject as deserving.  More importantly, most of 
the characteristics of the beneficiary are significant.  The beneficiary is more 
likely to be considered deserving if he is male or coloured, is married or has 
children.  A beneficiary is less likely to be considered deserving if he or she is 
older.  This perhaps indicates support for a male-breadwinner model (except for 
the age discrimination) together with some racial prejudice.  Among white 
respondents, the characteristics of the beneficiary are not significant, but some 
of the characteristics of the respondent are weakly significant. 
Appendix 6 reports the results of regressions on the amount awarded, by race of 
respondent, using only those respondents who considered the recipient deserving 
in the first place.  The dependent variable is the log of the amount awarded, and 
the data are weighted by gender.  Among African and coloured sub-samples, the 
characteristics of the beneficiary are not significant.  Among the white sub-
sample, however, they make a big difference.  White respondents seem to 
discriminate against younger beneficiaries, against married beneficiaries and 
against coloured beneficiaries (weakly).  In each sub-sample, different 
respondent characteristics stand out.  Married African respondents, rich or 
childless coloured respondents, and white men are more generous. 
Heckman 2-stage regressions (not shown in the appendices) are not warranted 
for the African or white sub-samples, because the two equations are not 
independent of each other.  Among the coloured sub-sample, some of the 
characteristics of the beneficiary other than race are significant in the initial 
assessment of desert. 
Overall, these regressions suggest somewhat different models operating among 
African, coloured and white sub-samples.  Coloured respondents seem to 
discriminate more in the initial assessment of desert, according to the 
characteristics of the beneficiary (including race, with coloured respondents 
discriminating in favour of coloured beneficiaries).  White respondents seem to 
discriminate more in the assessment of the award, i.e. in the size of the grant.  
There are no discernable patterns among African respondents. 
Exploring further the construction of desert 
The CAS 2003 survey included two other features that allows for further 
analysis of what respondents do or might take into account when assessing the 
desert of subjects in the vignettes.  First, the vignettes were followed by a series 
of attempts to persuade the respondent to change his or her mind, by presenting 
additional information.  Second, various questions were asked which allow an 
analysis of whether assessments of desert were related to assessments of the 
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opportunities open to people.  A full analysis of these data is not possible here, 
but some findings can be noted. 
Respondents were easily persuaded to change their views on the desert of a 
subject when faced with counter-arguments.  A minority of respondents who 
initially favoured financial assistance to the retrenched worker changed their 
minds when told that taxes might have to increase, and a large majority changed 
their minds when told that people like the subject might spend their money on 
alcohol.  Most respondents who initially opposed financial assistance changed 
their minds when told that the subject might suffer ill-health or death as a 
consequence of being poor, or that the subject’s children might drop out of 
school (see Seekings, 2005b).   
This mutability of attitudes in the face of additional information is affected by 
race.  In comparison to the regressions run on the initial responses to the 
vignettes, regressions run on changing responses show stronger results.  For 
G.7, coloured respondents are more likely to punish a drinker by changing their 
mind and opposing financial assistance.  For G.8 (but not G.9), African 
respondents are more likely to change their minds.  But most of the 
characteristics of the beneficiary are statistically significant: the respondent is 
more likely to change his/her mind if the beneficiary is female, African, older or 
unmarried, and less likely if the beneficiary is coloured.  Overall, the r2s for 
these probits on G.8 and G.9 are 25 percent and 19 percent respectively. 
Including data on respondents’ attitudes towards the causes of poverty does little 
to enhance an explanation of how respondents reach decisions on the desert of 
the subjects in the vignette.  Whilst white and coloured respondents do have 
different views on the causes of poverty to African respondents, these do not 
seem to explain differences in the assessment of desert.  In explaining 
respondents’ willingness to change their views, however, one or other of the 
factors is significant.  When told that the retrenched worker might spend the 
government grant on drink, respondents are more likely to change their mind 
and oppose financial assistance if they are generally sceptical about government 
intervention.  In other words, respondents who are generally sceptical about 
government intervention may sometimes support government assistance to the 
poor, in this case deserving retrenched workers, but they revert to more general 
scepticism when prompted by information about welfare recipients spending 
grants on drink.  A respondent is more likely to change his or her mind from 
opposing to supporting financial assistance to the retrenched worker if he/she 
thinks society is broadly meritocratic.  Put another way, believing that society is 
meritocratic might not affect whether or not a respondent deems a retrenched 
worker deserving of government support generally, but does push respondents to 
a more generous or supportive position when faced with evidence of real need. 
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 Consideration of diverse variables has not resulted in any satisfactory 
explanation of initial decisions in the vignette, although it has helped to explain 
subsequent changes of opinion when faced with additional information.  It is 
easy to show that race makes little difference, but it is hard to demonstrate 
clearly what it is that does make a difference.  There is any number of possible 
reasons for this.  One is that the attitudinal data are of poor quality.  Contrary to 
this, factor analysis does point to some credible and explicable clustering of 
variables.  A second reason is that the vignette (as well as some other questions) 
does not tap into the deeper axes of division over desert.  The issues posed in the 
initial vignette, to be blunt, are just not divisive enough.  A follow-up survey, 
the 2005 Cape Area Study, includes a more complex vignette (see Seekings, 
Jooste et al, 2005).  The sample for CAS 2005 is much larger than for CAS 
2003, so the result will hopefully be a much richer data-set.  
Conclusion 
The data does reject the hypotheses that white respondents will discriminate 
strongly against African or coloured subjects, and that African or coloured 
respondents will discriminate in favour of subjects of the same racial group.  
Most of the analyses suggested that race did not affect the initial assessment of 
desert; if there was any effect, it was small.  In other words, the initial 
assessment of desert appears to have been largely colour-blind.  When assessing 
the amount that a deserving subject should receive, however, race did matter.  
White respondents were the most generous, even controlling for class.  And, 
more curiously, respondents in general awarded white subjects awarded the 
largest grants.  White respondents were also less likely to change their opinions 
when faced with the prospect of tax increases to fund their generous awards.  
This all provides some support for the hypothesis that the racialisation of 
privilege has made white South Africans more supportive of some forms of 
redistribution.  White South Africans are certainly more generous than 
conventional portrayals suggest.  These findings from the experimental vignettes 
in the CAS 2003 survey are not dissimilar to Burns’ findings using data from 
field experiments. 
There are limits to the generosity of Capetonians, however.  Better-off, white 
respondents were opposed to a basic income grant, and significant minorities of 
African and coloured respondents were unconvinced.  What we cannot tell from 
the 2003 Cape Area Study is the extent to which this opposition and uncertainty 
are due to scepticism about undeserving categories of poor, i.e. not everyone 
deserves a minimum income, and the extent to which it is due to a reluctance to 
pay higher taxes.  The vignettes certainly provide evidence that minorities of 
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African and coloured people as well as white people considered some 
unemployed people as undeserving. 
Clearly further research is warranted into all of these issues.  The analysis of 
quantitative data from the 2003 Cape Area Study could usefully be 
supplemented with the findings of qualitative research on these issues, whether 
through in-depth interviews with individuals or discussion in groups.  The kind 
of research conducted by Hochschild in the USA could be replicated in South 
Africa.  Quantitative analysis could usefully be expanded through consideration 
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Appendix 1. Perceived desert, by characteristics of 
‘beneficiary’ and respondent 
 % say yes N Mean 
amount 
(R) 
Std. dev. N 
Characteristic of retrenched worker 
Male 59 303 914 695 145 Gender 
Female 62 285 953 799 159 
White 61 179 1035 768 80 
African 60 229 947 764 129 
Race / population 
group 
Coloured 60 108 836 708 95 
20s 56 237 880 783 116 
30s 60 162 864 689 84 
Age 
40s 66 189 1056 750 104 
Married 65 156 1040 797 136 Marital status 
Not married 57 349 851 702 168 
Yes 65 303 1031 734 165 Has children? 
No 56 285 822 757 139 
Yes 61 289 935 857 150 Dependable 
worker, actively 
looking for work? 
Not specified 60 179 934 630 154 
Characteristic of respondent 
Male 58 230 940 733 113 Gender 
Female 63 358 930 734 195 
White 64 139 1519 973 56 
African 61 197 685 399 112 
Race / population 
group 
Coloured 59 234 913 750 136 
20s 59 140 938 896 74 
30s 59 139 980 673 68 
Age 
40s 66 111 780 495 50 
Married 69 297 935 716 143 Marital status 
Not married 62 291 934 781 161 
Yes 61 426 874 682 223 Has children? 
No 58 161 1093 889 81 
Working 60 272 1097 856 133 Occupational 
status Not working      
Income Rich 62 123 1197 743 48 
< grade 7 59 72 704 361 38 
Grades 7 - 9 60 132 763 562 83 
Grades 10 -11 62 131 792 615 73 
Grade 12 60 137 1124 865 59 
Education 
> grade 12 59 112 1427 1000 54 
Note: mean amount awarded is only if an award was approved, i.e. if >0.  Data generated using vignette.do. 
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Appendix 2: Probit regression models for assessment of desert 
         Model A     Model B     Model C    Model D 
Beneficiary characteristics 
Male       0.11 (0.14)      0.12 (0.14)   
African      -0.06 (0.07)     -0.08 (0.07)  -0.00 (0.05) 
Coloured      0.12 (0.12)      0.11 (0.12)   0.04 (0.05) 
Aged in 30s     -0.09 (0.12)     -0.12 (0.12)   
Aged in 40s     -0.46 (0.42)     -0.52 (0.40)   
Married      0.31 (0.23)      0.34 (0.23)   
Has children      0.31* (0.19)      0.34 (0.19)   0.10** (0.04) 
Dependable worker, looking for work  0.09 (0.06)      0.09 (0.06)   
 
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics 
Male         -0.04 (0.04)  -0.03 (0.04)   
African          0.07    (0.06)  -0.07 (0.07)  -0.07 (0.08) 
Coloured         -0.10* (0.06)  -0.09 (0.06)  -0.09 (0.07) 
Married         -0.05 (0.05)  -0.05 (0.05)   
Has children          0.02 (0.05)   0.05 (0.05)   
Working         -0.02   (0.04)  -0.03 (0.04)   
Rich          0.01 (0.06)   0.04 (0.06)   
Neighbourhood income            -6.8e-08 (4.5e-07) 
 
Pairings 
Same race            0.03 (0.05)   
 
n          541      541      531     506 
pseudo r2        0.02      0.01      0.03     0.01 
 
Notes: All variables are dummies.  Using weighted data.  Standard errors reported in brackets. Coefficients are dprobits. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level.  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.  *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Appendix 3: Regression models for assessment of award 
         Model A     Model B     Model C    Model D 
Beneficiary characteristics 
Male       0.12 (0.29)      0.12 (0.27)   
African      -0.20 (0.14)     -0.22 (0.13)  -0.32***(0.11) 
Coloured     -0.08 (0.26)     -0.11 (0.25)  -0.26**(0.12) 
Aged in 30s     -0.04 (0.23)     -0.00 (0.22)   
Aged in 40s     -0.43 (0.93)     -0.38 (0.87) 
Married      0.39 (0.57)      0.38 (0.53) 
Has children      0.45 (0.40)      0.38 (0.37)   0.19**(0.10) 
Dependable worker, looking for work   0.07 (0.12)      0.04 (0.11) 
 
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics 
Male         -0.01 (0.08)   0.01 (0.08)   
African         -0.67***(0.13)  -0.65***(0.13)  -1.06***(0.18) 
Coloured         -0.50***(0.11)  -0.50***(0.12)  -0.92***(0.15) 
Married          0.03 (0.09)   0.06 (0.09)   
Has children         -0.22** (0.10)  -0.24** (0.10)   
Working          0.21** (0.08)   0.18** (0.08)   
Rich          0.17 (0.12)   0.19 (0.12) 
Neighbourhood income             2.7e-06*** (9.8e-07) 
 
Pairings 
Same race            0.05 (0.09)   
Constant     6.34***(0.29)   7.09***(0.13)  6.87***(0.31) 7.4*** (0.21) 
n         311      311      307      303 
r2         0.06      0.17      0.22      0.37 
Adjusted r2        0.04      0.15      0.18      0.36 
 
Notes: All variables are dummies.  Using weighted and logged data on awards.  Standard errors reported in brackets. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level.  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.  *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Appendix 4: Heckman 2-stage regressions 
Heckman selection model      Number of obs      =       526 
(regression model with sample selection)   Censored obs       =       223 
         Uncensored obs     =       303 
 
         Wald chi2(5)       =    132.69 
Log likelihood = -706.9068     Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
  
    Coefficient Std. Err.   z   P>z    95% Conf. Interval 
Amount of award  
Beneficiary is African   -0.45**   0.13 -3.46  0.001    -0.71 to -0.20 
Beneficiary is coloured     -0.48***      0.14 -3.49  0.000    -0.76 to -0.21 
Respondent is african     -1.20***      0.20 -6.12  0.000    -1.58 to -0.81 
Respondent is coloured     -0.99***      0.17 -5.94  0.000    -1.32 to -0.67 
Respondent’s neighbourhood income  3.02e-06**   9.77e-07   3.10  0.002     1.11e-06 to 4.94e-06 
Constant       8.24***   0.24 34.35  0.000     7.7 to 8.7 
 
Initial assessment of desert        
Beneficiary is African    0.28**   0.13  2.15  0.032     0.03 to 0.54 
Beneficiary is coloured      0.36**    0.14  2.52  0.012     0.08 to 0.64 
Beneficiary has children   0.21**     0.10   2.08  0.038     0.01 to 0.41 
Respondent is African      0.09    0.17 -0.56  0.578    -0.42 to 0.23 
Respondent is coloured   -0.10    0.15  -0.65  0.513    -0.39 to 0.20 
Constant        -0.06    0.16 -0.38  0.701    -0.39 to 0.26 
 
  
/athrho        -1.23    0.25 -4.84  0.000    -1.73 to -0.73 
/lnsigma         0.02       0.08      0.28  0.782    -0.14 to 0.19 
  
rho        -0.84    0.07       -0.94 to -0.63 
sigma         1.02     0.09       -0.86 to 1.20 
lambda        -0.86      0.14       -1.14 to -0.58 
 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):   chi2(1) = 6.84   Prob > chi2 = 0.0089  
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Appendix 5.  Probit regression models for assessment of desert, by race  
 
         African     Coloured        White 
      Respondents  respondents  respondents  
 
Beneficiary characteristics 
Male      -0.10 (0.24)   0.45** (0.20)  -0.23 (0.25)  
African       0.01 (0.12)  -0.15 (0.11)  -0.07 (0.12)  
Coloured     -0.10 (0.21)   0.39** (0.15)  -0.17 (0.29) 
Aged in 30s     -0.03 (0.19)  -0.26 (0.20)  -0.05 (0.25) 
Aged in 40s      0.23 (0.60)  -0.95** (0.09)   0.15 (0.81) 
Married     -0.13 (0.47)   0.77** (0.19)  -0.00 (0.58) 
Has children     -0.10 (0.34)   0.74***(0.19)  -0.09 (0.38) 
Dependable worker, looking for work   0.02 (0.10)   0.12 (0.10)   0.15 (0.10) 
 
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics 
Male       0.08  (0.07)  -0.12 (0.07)  -0.00 (0.08)   
Married       0.07 (0.08)  -0.09 (0.08)  -0.17* (0.09)  
Has children      -0.02 (0.08)   0.03 (0.09)   0.08 (0.12)   
Working      -0.06 (0.08)   0.05   (0.07)  -0.17* (0.08)   
Rich       0.18 (0.14)   0.22** (0.09)  -0.16* (0.08) 
 
n            184   217   124 
pseudo r2           0.02        0.10          0.13 
 
Notes: All variables are dummies.  Using weighted data.  Standard errors reported in brackets.  Coefficients are dprobits. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level.  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.  *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Appendix 6: Regression models for assessment of award, by race  
 
           African     Coloured        White 
      Respondents  respondents  respondents  
 
Beneficiary characteristics 
Male       0.10 (0.37)   0.17 (0.43)  -1.18 (0.84)   
African      -0.12 (0.17)  -0.32 (0.21)   0.18 (0.33)  
Coloured     -0.06 (0.33)   0.03 (0.38)  -1.37* (0.75) 
Aged in 30s     -0.03 (0.29)  -0.16 (0.35)   1.86***(0.66) 
Aged in 40s     -0.21 (1.17)  -0.93 (1.42)   4.60* (2.44) 
Married     -0.10 (0.71)   1.01 (0.87)  -3.11** (1.53) 
Has children      0.30 (0.51)   0.47 (0.61)  -0.54 (0.98) 
Dependable worker, looking for work  -0.14 (0.16)   0.15 (0.17)   0.25 (0.30) 
 
Respondent socio-demographic characteristics 
Male      -0.14 (0.11)  -0.00 (0.13)   0.48** (0.23)   
Married       0.29** (0.14)   0.02 (0.14)  -0.12 (0.24)  
Has children      -0.20 (0.13)  -0.29* (0.17)  -0.28 (0.25)   
Working       0.09 (0.12)   0.16 (0.13)   0.00 (0.24)   
Rich       0.08 (0.27)   0.36* (0.19)   0.05 (0.22) 
 
Constant      6.47***(0.39)   6.24***(0.44)   7.61***(0.89) 
 
n             112         138   57 
r2             0.17         0.18   0.42 
Adjusted r2            0.06         0.09   0.24 
 
Notes: All variables are dummies.  Using weighted and logged data on awards.  Standard errors reported in brackets. 
* Significant at the 0.1 level.  ** Significant at the 0.05 level.  *** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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